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COMMENTS
UNITED STATES v. CITY OF CHICAGO: IMPACT STANDARD
APPLICABLE TO STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
UNDER TITLE VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' prohibits employment
practices that discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. 2 As originally enacted, Title VII exempted state and
local governments from the provisions of the Act.3 The United
States Commission on Civil Rights, finding that state and local
government employment was characterized by many discriminatory
procedures, criticized the denial of this federal remedy to employees
of those governments.4 Congress recognized the anomaly of extend-
1. 42 U.S.C., tit. VII, §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
Section 2000e(b) defined employer as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has twenty-five or more employees . . . ." Id. § 2000e(b) (1970). Section 2000e-2 pro-
vided:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportun-
ities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2. Section 2000e-2(h), interpreted by the Supreme Court to permit tests that are
job related, provided:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an un-
lawful employment practice for an employer. . . to give and to act upon the
results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its
administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended, or used to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(h).
3. Section 2000e(b)(1) reads in pertinent part: "The term 'employer' means a person en-
gaged in an industry affecting commerce. . . but such term does not include (1). . .a State
or political subdivision thereof. . . ." Id. § 2000e(b)(1).
4. UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIvIL RIGHTS, FOR ALL THE PEOPLE... By ALL THE PEOPLE
121 (1969) [hereinafter cited as FOR ALL THE PEOPLE]. The Commission found that
"[m]inority group members are denied equal access to State and local government jobs."
Id. at 118. This exclusion is accomplished, the Commission explained, "by overt discrimina-
tion in personnel actions and hiring decisions, a lack of positive action by governments to
redress the consequences of past discrimination, and discriminatory and biased treatment on
the job." Id. at 119. Particularly relevant to the subject of this Comment, the Commission
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ing federal assistance to private employees injured by discrimina-
tory practices while denying assistance to similarly aggrieved public
employees' and responded by adopting the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972,8 thereby amending Title VII to include
state and local government employees.7
Congress ostensibly intended that legal principles defined in pre-
1972 Title VII litigation would apply equally to cases involving state
and local governments under the 1972 amendments. 8 Nevertheless,
whether the Supreme Court will acknowledge this congressional in-
suggested that the "[blarriers to equal employment are greater in police and fire depart-
ments than in any other area of State and local government." Id. Concluding that enforce-
ment of the fourteenth amendment's prohibition against discriminatory state action had been
sporadic and burdensome, the Commission recommended eliminating the exemption of state
and local governments from the coverage of Title VII. Id. at 128.
5. The report accompanying the Senate bill, S. 2515, containing a provision expanding the
jurisdiction of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include state and local governments, interpreted
the findings of FOR ALL THE PEOPLE, supra note 4, to indicate that "employment discrimina-
tion in State and local governments is more pervasive than in the private sector." S. REP.
No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1971) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 415]. The report
accompanying the analogous House bill, H.R. 1746, emphasized the injustice of withholding
federal remedies from the victims of constitutionally prohibited discrimination because of
their peculiar employment status. H.R. REp. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 17-19 [hereinafter
cited as H.R. REP. No. 238], reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137, 2152-
54 [hereinafter cited as AD. NEws].
6. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970) [hereinafter cited
as the 1972 amendments].
For discussion and analysis of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 and its
legislative history, see Sape and Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Op-
portunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 824 (1972).
7. The definition of "person" found in § 2000e(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
amended to include "governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (Supp. V 1975). Section 2000e(b), defining "employer" was amended to
include persons employing fifteen or more employees, and the "State or political subdivision
thereof" exemption was deleted. Id. § 2000e(b).
One commentator has described the expansion of Title VII to state and local government
employees as "the most significant change in the scope of the Act." Mitchell, An Advocate's
View of the 1972 Amendments to Title VII, 5 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REv. 311, 322 (1973).
8. Congressman Carl Perkins and Senator Harrison Williams, speaking for the House and
Senate conferees, set forth the consensus: "In any area where the new law does not address
itself, or in any areas where a specific contrary intention is not indicated, it was assumed that
the present case law as developed by the courts would continue to govern the applicability
and construction of Title VII." 118 CONG. RIc. 7166 (1972) (remarks of Senator Williams);
id. at 7564 (remarks of Congressman Perkins).
The Supreme Court, apparently recognizing this intent, stated in Morton v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535 (1974): "In general, it may be said that the substantive anti-discrimination law
embraced in Title VII [prior to the 1972 amendments] was carried over and applied to the
Federal Government [under the 1972 amendments]." Id. at 547. See also Chandler v. Roude-
bush, 425 U.S. 840, 841 (1976).
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tent is uncertain. This irresolution is manifested most clearly in the
current controversy over the standard of proof necessary to establish
a Title VII violation.
In 1971, the Supreme Court held in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.9
that employment practices, procedures, or tests, though facially
neutral and innocent in intent, are unlawful under Title VII if they
operate to exclude a protected group at a disproportionate rate. 0
Under Griggs, statistical evidence that minority applicants are un-
successful disproportionately by itself shifts the burden to the de-
fendants to prove that their tests or practices are related directly to
job performance." If pre-1972 case law has been incorporated into
post-1972 decisions, the "impact or effect" standard established in
Griggs should govern Title VII cases brought under the 1972 amend-
ments. 2
In contrast to Griggs, in 1976, the Supreme Court held in
Washington v. Davis3 that a plaintiff alleging governmental em-
ployment discrimination under the fifth" or fourteenth amend-
9. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Griggs decision has been described as "the most important
court decision in employment discrimination law." B. SCHm & P. GRossmAN, EMPLOYmrr
DISCRIMINATION LAW 5 (1976).
10. 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). The Fifth Circuit commented on Griggs as follows:
In Griggs,. . . the Supreme Court reshaped the statutory concept of discrimina-
tion in terms of consequence rather than motive, effect rather than purpose, to
make clear that Title VII requires more of an employer who has discriminated
in the past than present and future equal treatment of similarly situated em-
ployees regardless of their race. Under the mandate of Title VII, such an em-
ployer must scrutinize even the steps he now takes with neutral or benevolent
motives to determine if they operated as 'built-in headwinds' for minority
groups and are unrelated to job performance. If they have that operative effect,
they contravene Title VII.
Peters v. Mo.-Pac. R.R., 483 F.2d 490, 498 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1002 (1973)
(footnotes omitted).
11. 401 U.S. at 432. The district and appellate courts in Griggs concluded that a showing
of racial purpose or invidious intent to discriminate was necessary under Title VII. Id. at 428-
29. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Title VII abolished tests and practices that
discriminate, even if no intentional discrimination is shown. Id. at 430. "If an employment
practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job perform-
ance," the Court said, "the practice is prohibited." Id. at 431.
12. See note 8 supra & accompanying text.
13. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
14. The due process clause of the fifth amendment provides in pertinent part:
No person shall be. . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; . ...
U.S. CONsT. AMEND. V.
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ments'5 must prove that an employer intentionally discriminated
against him. Refusing to use the impact test to establish an equal
protection violation of the fourteenth amendment, the Court in-
stead followed a line of cases holding that if no discriminatory intent
is shown, a racially disproportionate effect alone will not demon-
strate the unconstitutionality of a law or official act. 6
Because Griggs was a Title VII case and Davis a fourteenth
amendment case, the cases may be distinguished easily; however,
dicta in a 1976 Supreme Court case, General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert, 17 suggests that discrimination has the same meaning under
both the fourteenth amendment and Title VII.1 8 The issue raised,
then, is whether the constitutional standard of intent should govern
interpretations of the amendments to Title VII enacted pursuant to
Congress' power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. 9
15. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part:
Section 1. . . . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisions of this article.
U.S. CONsT. AMEND. XIV.
Plaintiffs suing under the due process clause of the fifth amendment or the due process or
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment usually invoke the 1871 Act imple-
menting the fourteenth amendment, which Act states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depri-
vation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
16. 426 U.S. at 239. The Court said that an examination that ignores discriminatory pur-
pose and focuses "solely on the racially differential impact" of the practices "is not the
constitutonal rule." Id. at 238-39.
17. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
18. Id. at 133.
19. Id. at 133, 145. Gilbert questioned the legality of an employer's sickness and accident
insurance plan excluding temporary disability resulting from pregnancy. The plaintiffs
argued that the exclusion constituted sex discrimination under Title VII. The Court ruled
that if the benefits of the plan to men and women were weighed, no gender-based discrimina-
tory effect existed.
Language in the majority opinion limited the effects test of Griggs to "some circumstances"
and emphasized that the Court was only "assuming that it [was] not necessary in this case
to prove intent to establish a prima facie violation of § 703(a)(1)." Id. at 137. This language
360
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Although the Supreme Court has not decided the issue,20 the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. City
of Chicago,21 held that proof of intentional discrimination is unnec-
essary to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination
against racial minorities under Title VII.2 In addition, the court
stated that a statistical showing of a disproportionate, adverse im-
pact on minority groups will shift the burden to the employer to
prove that the challenged tests or practices are related directly to
the job in question.23 By refusing to demand proof of purposeful
discrimination, the court rejected the defendant's arguments that
the less stringent constitutional test of Washington v. Davis24 is the
proper Title VII standard for public employers. Instead, the court
held that employment practices of public employers are to be
judged by the same impact standards applied to private employers
by the Supreme Court under the original Title VII.2s Few district
prompted two concurring justices to refuse to join in any implication that Griggs was no
longer good law. 429 U.S. at 146 (Stewart and Blackmun, JJ., concurring separately). Justice
Brennan, in his dissenting opinion declared, "Notwithstanding unexplained and inexplicable
implications to the contrary in the majority opinion, this Court . . .and every Court of
Appeals now have firmly settled that a prima facie violation of Title VII ... , is established
by demonstrating that a facially neutral classification has the effect of discriminating against
members of a defined class." Id. at 153-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
To circumvent the majority opinion's suggestion that discrimination has the same meaning
under the fourteenth amendment and Title VII, one could argue that the commerce clause,
rather than the fourteenth amendment, is the source of congressional power under which
discrimination by state and local governments was proscribed. This alternative theory is
undermined, however, by the Supreme Court's decision in National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833 (1976). Usery held that the doctrine of federalism protected state and local
governments from congressional regulation of the wages and hours of state and local employ-
ees under the commerce clause. Usery, then, may require that the 1972 amendments to Title
VII derive their validity, if any, from Congress's power under the fourteenth amendment,
which in turn may dictate that the constitutional intent standard govern Title VII law as
applied to the states. Accord, Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 447 (1976). For a more
detailed discussion of Usery, see notes 168-73 infra & accompanying text.
20. In United States v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 1094 (D.S.C. 1977), aff'd per curiam,
434 U.S. 1026 (1978), the Supreme Court merely affirmed without comment the lower court's
ruling that the government employer did not discriminate. Although the lower court held the
defendant state government to the impact standard on the Title VII claims, it also found for
the defendant using the intent standard on the constitutional claims. Thus, had the lower
court determined that intent was the applicable standard for the Title VII challenge, the
result would have been the same. Therefore, the Court's affirmation provides little guidance
on the impact versus intent issue. See notes 181-99 infra & accompanying text.
21. 573 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1978).
22. Id. at 421.
23. Id.
24. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
25. The Seventh Circuit stated: "Having determined that no showing of intentional dis-
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courts have ruled on the issue, and the Chicago decision is one of
the first holdings by a circuit court declaring the necessary standard
of proof to establish racial discrimination by a public employer
under Title VII.26 This Comment submits that although the court
crimination is required, it is necessary to consider whether the ... exams and ... ratings
... are violative of Title VII under the discriminatory impact standard of Griggs and
Albemarle." 573 F.2d at 424.
26. See Scott v. City of Anniston, 430 F. Supp. 508 (N.D. Ala. 1977) (constitutional stan-
dard of intent applicable to local governments under Title VII); Harrington v. Vandalia-
Butler Bd. of Educ., 418 F. Supp. 603 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (impact standard applicable to public
employers under Title VII).
In United States v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 1094 (D.S.C. 1977), aff'd per curiam, 434
U.S. 1026 (1978), a three-judge district court applied the impact and job-relatedness tests to
a state government employer. The court's ruling that the defendant state government did not
racially discriminate in its employment practices in violation of Title VII was affirmed by
the Supreme Court without comment in a per curiam opinion. 434 U.S. 1026 (1978); see notes
180-97 infra & accompanying text.
In a case similar to Chicago, the Eighth Circuit employed the disproportionate impact
standard in a pattern or practice suit brought by the United States against the city of St.
Louis. The city used a written test as one of three measurements of the qualifications of
incumbent fire department employees seeking promotion to the fire captain's position. Per-
formance on the examination was the primary factor determining rank on the eligibility list.
The district court concluded that the test had a disparate impact on blacks. Using this
finding, the court of appeals stated as follows:
It is a distinguishing feature of a Title VII cause of action that discriminatory
impact suffices to establish a prima facie showing of discrimination. The recent
case of Washington v. Davis establishes that a law or other official act is not
unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact regard-
less of whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose. However, Congress'
statutory standard for Title VII, where discriminatory purpose need not be
proved, is unshaken by the Washington decision.
United States v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 510 (8th Cir. 1977) (citations omitted), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1978).
All circuit courts of appeals have adopted the principle that the discriminatory effect of a
facially neutral criterion establishes a prima facie violation of Title VII by a private employer;
a few have found the impact standard applicable to public employers under the Title VII
amendments. E.g., Kinsey v. First Regional Sec., Inc., 557 F.2d 830, 839 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Richardson v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Health, 561 F.2d 489, 491 (3d Cir. 1977)(impact standard
applicable to public employer); Robinson v. City of Dallas, 514 F.2d 1271, 1272-73 (5th Cir.
1975)(impact standard applicable to public employer); Muller v. United States Steel Corp.,
509 F.2d 923, 927 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); Boston Chapter, NAACP,
Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1021 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975)(impact
standard applicable to public employer); United States v. Masonry Contractors Ass'n of
Memphis, Inc., 497 F.2d 871, 875 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal
Lathers, Local 46, 471 F.2d 408, 414 n.11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); United
States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 368 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Chesapeake &
Ohio Ry., 471 F.2d 582, 586 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 939 (1973); United States
v. United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 169, 457 F.2d 210, 214 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
851 (1972); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 550-51 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
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in United States v. City of Chicagor correctly applied the impact
standard to state and local governments, it perhaps misread the
Supreme Court's intention to re'quire less strict scrutiny of job-
relatedness in suits brought against state and local governments
than is mandated by Griggs v. Duke Power Co.25
ORIGINAL TITLE VII: LEGISrLTv PURPOSE
Title VII does not specify the conduct prohibited or the standards
against which the courts must measure the employers' actions.
From 1964 until the Griggs decision in 1971, courts relied upon the
terms of the statute and its legislative history to determine the
congressional purpose underlying Title VII,29 but failed to find pre-
cise guides.
Senator Dirksen, who was primarily responsible for passage of the
bill that became Title VII,rs urged the Senate to consider carefully
the wording of Title VII: "The courts will take a look at the language
in the bill, and out of it they will finally come to a conclusion as to
what was the intent."31 Title VII as finally approved by both houses
of Congress 32 did not define discrimination; it simply prohibited it.s
The importance of the employer's intent or purpose in proof of dis-
crimination was discussed initially during the 1964 Title VII de-
27. 573 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1978).
28. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
29. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 401 U.S. 424
(1971); Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
30. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 431, 444 (1966).
31. 110 CoNG. REC. 6445 (1964).
32. See note 2 supra.
33. Senators Clark and Case, floor managers of Title VII, defined discrimination thusly:
"To discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a difference in treatment or favor, and
those distinctions or differences in treatment or favor which are prohibited by section 704 are
those which are based on any five [sic] of the forbidden criteria: race, color, religion, sex,
and national origin." 110 CONG. REc. 7213 (1964).
The Senators' concept of discrimination emphasized different treatment, not disparate
impact. Congress, however, did consider the relation between the adverse effect of employ-
ment testing on culturally disadvantaged groups and the legitimate efficiency and productiv-
ity concerns of businessmen. The result was the Tower amendment:
[lit shall not be an unlawful employment practice. . . for an employer to give
and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided
that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed,
intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:357
bates.3 4 The consensus was that Title VII afforded relief only if the
court found that an employer had intentionally perpetrated an un-
lawful employment practice.35 The Tower amendment excluded
bona fide ability tests from the definition of such a practice.36
Early scholarly treatments of discrimination concentrated on
subjective discriminatory intent or prejudice and the dissimilar
treatment of members of a similarly situated group.3 Initially, a
finding of intentional discrimination by the lower courts, as required
by section 2000e-5(g) of Title VII, was predicated upon the existence
of mental elements of prejudice or purpose to discriminate.3' At
least one court, however, modified the necessary finding of intent
by focusing on the post-Title VII consequences of pre-Title VII dis-
crimination. 39 Nevertheless, prior to the Griggs decision, lower
courts reasoned that, absent an intent to discriminate and in the
presence of a genuine business purpose, facially neutral selection
criteria perpetuating the effects of past discrimination did not vio-
34. Mr. Case. What is an unlawful employment practice?
Mr. Ervin. It is the contents of a man's mind. It is the intent he has in mind.
Mr. Case. No.
Mr. Case. The man [the employer] must do or fail to do something in regard to employ-
ment. There must be a specific external act, more than a mental act. Only if he does the act
because of the grounds stated in the bill would there be any legal consequences.
Mr. Ervin. But we do not judge a man on the ground of his employing somebody or his
failing to employ somebody. These are acts which are external. They have no influence
whatever on the decision. The only decision is made on the state of mind which accompanied
the act or the omission to act.
Mr. Case. The only way a state of mind can be proved is by an external act, or by a
pattern of acts, of a man, or by a treatment that was given. The burden of proof is on the
plaintiff. The only finding the court can make is one for the purpose of injunctive or preven-
tive relief.
110 CONG. REc. 7253-55 (1964).
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970).
36. See note 29 supra.
37. Belton, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Decade of Private Enforcement and
Judicial Developments, 20 ST. Louis U. L. REv. 225, 240 (1976).
38. Dobbins v. Local 212, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 292 F. Supp. 413, 443-44 (S.D. Ohio
1968). The court in Dobbins stated, however, that an intent to discriminate could be "inferred
from the operation and effect of the statute or rule or from the conduct itself." Id. at 448.
39. Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 516 (E.D. Va. 1968). The court in
Quarles held that absence of intent to discriminate after the adoption of Title VII was
irrelevant in the context of a seniority system that perpetuated pre-Title VII intentional
discrimination. Id. The court commented: "It is also apparent that Congress did not intend
to freeze an entire generation of Negro employees into discriminatory patterns that existed
prior to the act." Id.
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late Title VII." Plaintiffs had the burden of showing that no con-
ceivable business purpose justified the adverse impact on minori-
ties, but employer-defendants were not required to demonstrate job-
relatedness."
ORIGINAL TITLE VII: SUPREME COURT TREATMENT
The Supreme Court established Title VII standards for private
employers in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 42 seven years after the pas-
sage of Title VII. In Griggs, black employees challenged the com-
pany's hiring and transfer requirements of a high school diploma
and a passing score on a general intelligence test.43 The Court con-
cluded that, absent proof by the employer that its tests were job-
40. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1232 (1970), rev'd, 401 U.S. 424
(1971). In Griggs the Fourth Circuit held that a test or educational requirement sustaining
the effects of past discrimination may not violate the Title VII rights of employees hired
subsequent to the enactment of the requirement if it is justified by a legitimate business
purpose. Id.; see Note, Business Necessity under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A
No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98, 100 (1976).
41. 420 F.2d 1225, 1235 (4th Cir. 1970). Prior to the Fourth Circuit's decision, however,
erosion of the intent requirement had already begun. The Fifth Circuit rejected the doctrine
that Title VII required a showing of subjective intent to discriminate. Local 189, United
Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1969). The court held that
persistence in conduct with known discriminatory effects raised an inference of intent suffi-
cient to satisfy the wording of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) and that the intent requirement was
satisfied if the discriminatory employment practice was not merely accidental. Id. at 996;
accord, Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 480 F.2d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 1973); Spurlock v.
United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216, 218 (10th Cir. 1972). The Seventh Circuit, analyzing §
2000e-5(g), held that the intent requirement limited the relief available but did not define
the standard of liability. Title VII is violated if the employer simply engages in an unlawful
employment practice; discriminatory intent is not required. Williams v. General Foods Corp.,
492 F.2d 399, 403-04 (7th Cir. 1974).
42. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
43. Id. at 427-28. The class action suit alleged that the company's requirements of a high
school diploma and a satisfactory score on a standardized intelligence test for promotion to
positions previously held exclusively by white employees violated Title VII. After the district
court dismissed the complaint, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243 (M.D.N.C. 1968),
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed in part. Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970). The Fourth Circuit upheld the right to injunctive
relief of six employees hired before the implementation of the high school diploma require-
ment, but agreed with the district court that a test need not be job-related to survive Title
VI's prohibition of ability tests "designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin." 420 F.2d at 1235 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-2(h)
(1970)). A strong dissent foreshadowed the Supreme Court's reversal of Griggs, by interpret-
ing Title VII to condemn practices fair in form but discriminatory in substance unless justi-
fied by their demonstrated relation to job performance. Id. at 1237 (Sobeloff, J., dissenting).
To hold otherwise, the dissent commented, would reduce Title VII "to mellifluous but hollow
rhetoric." Id. at 1238.
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related,44 a violation of Title VII could be proved by discriminatory
effect alone. Considering the plain language of the statute and the
congressional debate, the Court found that Congress' purpose was
to remove barriers to equal employment favoring white employees.45
Although the Court reasoned that Title VII did not require the
hiring of an employee simply because he was the member of a mi-
nority or was the object of past discrimination, it held that Title VII
prohibits procedures or tests that are facially neutral or innocent in
intent, if such tests perpetuated the effect of previous discrimina-
tory practices." The standard, therefore, required only a showing of
a disparate impact on minority groups and lack of job-relatedness,
regardless of the employer's motive." The Court interpreted dis-
criminatory impact as the conduct prohibited by Title VII because
it believed that Congress was concerned primarily with the conse-
quences of discriminatory practices, not with the employer's moti-
vation. 8 After Griggs, a plaintiff need not prove the defendant's
discriminatory intent; conversely, nor is the defendant's subjective
good faith a defense.
According to Griggs, the employer must meet stringent standards
of job-relatedness to justify practices discriminatory in effect." The
tests in Griggs violated Title VII because they reflected educational
and cultural deprivation more accurately than ability to perform
job-related tasks. 0 The Court believed that the guidelines an-
nounced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), the agency established to enforce Title VII, should be con-
sidered carefully, for they expressed congressional intent.5' The
44. 401 U.S. at 431. The Court held that "[t]he Act proscribes not only overt discrimina-
tion but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone
is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot
be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited." Id.
45. Id. at 429-30.
46. Id. at 430-31.
47. Id. at 432. The Court explained that "good intent or absence of discriminatory intent
does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in
headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability." Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 436.
50. Id. at 430-31.
51. Id. at 433-34. The EEOC Guidelines on Employment Testing Procedures, issued Au-
gust 24, 1966, provided in pertinent part:
The Commission accordingly interprets 'professionally developed ability test'
to mean a test which fairly measures the knowledge or skills required by the
particular job or class of jobs which the applicant seeks, or which fairly affords
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1978] TITLE VII IMPACT STANDARD
Court concluded that an employment test must be related specifi-
cally to the tasks to be performed on the job or to the criteria
necessary for performing the job; a test that merely measured a
person's general abilities and capacities, some of which might not
the employer a chance to measure the applicant's ability to perform a particular
job or class of jobs. The fact that a test was prepared by an individual or
organization claiming expertise in test preparation does not, withdut more, jus-
tify its use within the meaning of Title VII.
Id., quoted in Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433 n.9.
Recognizing the need for a uniform set of guidelines on the use of tests and other selection
-procedures, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Civil Service Commission,
the Department of Labor, and the Department of Justice adopted the Uniform Guidelines
on Employee Selection Procedures on August 25, 1978. These guidelines supercede those
previously issued and provide in pertinent part:
' * . The use of any selection procedure which has an adverse impact on the
hiring, promotion, or other employment or membership opportunities of mem-
bers of any race, sex, or ethnic group will be considered to be discriminatory and
inconsistent with these guidelines, unless the procedure has been validated in
accordance with these guidelines, or the provisions of section 6 below [involving
use of alternative selection procedures] are satisfied.
A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths
(4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will
generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of ad-
verse impact ....
SEC. 16. Definitions. The following definitions shall apply throughout these
guidelines:
B. Adverse impact. A substantially different rate of selection in hiring, promo-
tion, or other employment decision which works to the disadvantage of members
of a race, sex, or ethnic group.
C. Compliance with these guidelines. Use of a selection procedure is in com-
pliance with these guidelines if such use has been validated in accord with these
guidelines (as defined below), or if such use does not result in adverse impact
on any race, sex, or ethnic group . . ., or, in unusual circumstances, if use of
the procedure is otherwise justified in accord with Federal law.
D. Content validity. Demonstrated by data showing that the content of a
selection procedure is representative of important aspects of performance on the
job.
E. Construct validity. Demonstrated by data showing that the selection pro-
cedure measures the degree to which candidates have identifiable characteris-
tics which have been determined to be important for successful job performance.
F. Criterion-related validity. Demonstrated by empirical data showing that
the selection procedure is predictive of or significantly correlated with important
elements of work behavior.
43,Fed. Reg. 38,297 & 38,307 (1978).
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be required to perform a particular job, was not sufficiently job-
related. 2
In 1975, in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,5" the Court reaffirmed
the private employer's heavy burden of proof. The plaintiffs alleged
that the defendant's use of a general intelligence test for employ-
ment discriminated against black applicants in violation of Title
VI.5 The district court found a discriminatory effect, but denied
backpay because the employer had not used the test in bad faith"
and refused to enjoin further use of the tests because they were
found to be job-related. 6 The Supreme Court reversed; the tests,
measured against the EEOC Guidelines, were not job-related.5 7
Griggs, the Court reminded the parties, commanded that a test
specifically measure abilities to perform a particular job; therefore,
the defendant must show both that such tests are related manifestly
to the job in question 58 and that they are a business necessity.59 The
Court awarded backpay, explaining that Griggs had held that intent
was not a necessary element of a Title VII violation. Thus, to make
bad faith, or discriminatory intent, a prerequisite of receiving a
remedy for such violation would not comport with Title VIl's pur-
pose of fully compensating victims of employment discrimination.6'
Albemarle summarized the procedure for suing under Title VII.
The complaining party may establish a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation by showing that the test "select[s] applicants for hire or
promotion in a racial pattern significantly different from that of the
pool of applicants." 2 Once discriminatory effect is shown, the em-
52. 401 U.S. at 436. "What Congress has commanded is that any tests used must measure
the person for the job and not the person in the abstract." Id.
53. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
54. Id. at 409-10.
55. Id. at 410.
56. Id. at 410-11.
57. Id. at 435-36.
58. Id. at 425 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 422 (citing Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 425. During the Title VII debate in 1964, Senator Hubert Humphrey defined a
pattern or practice of discrimination in the following manner:
[A] pattern or practice would be present only when the denial of rights consists
of something more than an isolated, sporadic incident, but is repeated, routine,
or of a generalized nature. . . .The point is that single, insignificant, isolated
acts of discrimination by a single business would not justify a finding of a
pattern or practice.
110 CONG. REC. 14,270 (1964).
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ployer must prove that the questioned tests or procedures are job-
related and a business necessity."3 If the employer succeeds, the
plaintiff may still prevail by showing that other, equally useful
tests, which do not discriminate on a racial basis, could be used."4
Such a showing would be evidence that the defendant's test was
simply a pretext used to perpetuate discrimination.65
TITLE VII AMENDMENTS: LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE
Aware of the Griggs' standards, Congress considered the changed
meaning of discrimination in drafting the 1972 amendments. The
House and Senate reports on the proposed amendments record the
failure of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including Title VII, to stem
employment discrimination. By 1972, legislators no longer defined
discrimination as "a series of isolated and distinguishable events,
for the most part due to ill-will on the part of some identifiable
individual or organization,"6 but instead believed it to be the result
of complex and pervasive "'systems' and 'effects' rather than sim-
ply intentional wrongs."6 Analysis in terms of systems and effects
revealed previously obscured discrimination. 6 Because Congress
intended to reach all racism, even that in the guise of superficially
63. The employer must show a correlatiobn between the challenged tests or practices and
the job being sought by means of a validation study. Such a study determines whether a test
actually and reliably measures what has been previously defined as adequate job perform-
ance. "A test is valid and job-related if it measures the person against important elements of
the job necessary for successful job performance." Note, Employment Testing And The
Federal Executive Agency Guidelines On Employee Selection Procedures: One Step Forward
And Two Steps Backward For Equal Employment Opportunity, 26 CATm. U. L. Rav. 852,861
(1977).
64. 422 U.S. at 425.
65. Id.
66. S. REP. No. 415, supra note 5, at 5; H.R. REP. No. 238, supra note 5, at 7, reprinted in
AD. NEws, supra note 5, at 2144.
67. Id.
68. The Senate report commanded the U.S. Civil Service Commission "to undertake a
thorough re-examination of its entire testing and qualification program to ensure that the
standards enunciated in the Griggs case are fully met." S. REP. No. 415, supra note 5, at 14-
15.
The House version of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act would have amended the
testing section of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970), to stipulate that employment tests
be directly related to the determination of bona fide occupational qualifications reasonably
necessary to perform the normal-duties of the particular position. H.R. REP. No. 238, supra
note 5, reprinted in AD. NEWS, supra note 5, at 2157, 2165. The amendment failed in the
House-Senate conference. Nevertheless, the House report revealed the legislators' support for
the effects test.
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objective requirements, it applied to local government employers
the substantive portion of Title VII case law holding that any con-
duct having an adverse impact on a minority class and not shown
to predict job performance was discriminatory. 9
Several policy objectives favor an interpretation that Congress
intended to adopt the Griggs formula. The difficulty, if not impossi-
bility, of proving specific discriminatory intent underlying facially
neutral criteria or conduct denies the employee an effective remedy.
The use of facially neutral criteria may allow an employer to dis-
criminate, yet conceal a motive: the criteria are applied equally to
all employees but operate to exclude disproportionately more blacks
than whites. 0 Allowing the employee to establish a prima facie case
by proving discriminatory effect necessitates the use of statistical
and other objective evidence, thus removing the speculative ele-
ment of intent from the court's consideration." The use of the im-
pact standard for judging employment discrimination thus helps
implement the national policy of eradicating employment discrimi-
nation.
The effects test also may redress employment practices that per-
petuate past discrimination. The present effects of these practices
may not originate from a present intent to discriminate, but, if
uncorrected, past discrimination may continue to limit the employ-
ment opportunities of minorities.72 Furthermore, placing the onus
on the employer to justify the discriminatory effects, rather than on
the excluded applicants, is a more equitable distribution of the
burden of proof. The employer, with greater knowledge'Of its organi-
zation, easier access to information, and familiarity with the inter-
ests served by the allegedly discriminatory practice, can rebut more
readily an inference of discrimination than can the applicant dis-
prove every reasonable explanation.7 1
A court's most critical consideration in determining whether to
apply the intent or impact standard to government employers will
be which standard is in accord with the legislative intent of the Title
69. See note 8 supra & accompanying text.
70. As the Eighth Circuit stated in a Title VII case alleging housing discrimination,
"[C]lever men may easily conceal their motivations .... " United States v. City of Black
Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974).
71. See United States v. City of Chicago, 385 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
72. See Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 516 (E.D. Va. 1968).
73. See id. at 553.
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VII amendments. Unless Congress has exceeded its authority by
imposing certain standards on the states, 7 the court's role is limited
to ascertaining the congressional will and determining that the leg-
islation is rationally related to a legitimate, non-racially based
goal.15
Congress' original purpose in enacting Title VII was to eradicate
employment discrimination.76 By extending this Act to public em-
ployers, Congress chose to give state, local, and federal employees
the same protections enjoyed by private employees.77 The standards
Congress intended to apply should include Supreme Court interpre-
tations of the original Title VII, particularly the Griggs holding
requiring only impact and job-relatedness.7 8 Any other interpreta-
tion would nullify the will of Congress in extending Title VII to
protect public employees. 9
TITLE VII AMENDMENTS: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Although its intent is clear, whether Congress may oversee state
and local governments to the same extent it regulates private em-
74. See note 19 supra: notes 168-73 infra & accompanying text.
75. See Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194, 198 (1922).
76. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416 (1975).
77. See H.R. REP. No. 238, supra note 5, at 1, reprinted in AD. NEWS, supra note 5, at 2137.
78. See note 8 supra.
79. The House report found that tests "often operate unreasonably and unnecessarily to
the disadvantage of minority individuals." H.R. REP. No. 238, supra note 5, at 20, reprinted
in AD. NEWS, supra note 5, at 2156. The House report continues:
"Such tests are often irrelevant to the job to be performed by the individual
being treated . . . . An aptitude test that fails to predict job performance in
the same way for both minorities and whites, or fails to predict job performance
at all is an invalid test. In. . . [Griggs], the court held that employment tests,
even if valid on their face and applied in a non-discriminatory manner, were
invalid if they tended to discriminate against minorities and the company could
not show an overriding reason why such tests were necessary. . . . The provi-
sions of the bill are fully in accord with the decision of the Court and with the
testing guidelines established by the Commission [EEOC]. The addition of the
requirement for a bona fide occupational qualification which is reasonably nec-
essary to perform the normal duties of the position to which it is applied requires
that employers, who use employment tests as determinants for qualifications of
employees for a particular job, must determine whether the test is necessary for
the particular position to which it is applied. Even after such determination, if
the use of the test acts to maintain existing or past discriminatory imbalances
in the job, or tends to discriminate against applicants on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin, the employer must show an overriding business
necessity to justifv use of the test.
Id. at 21-22, reprinted in AD. NEWS, supra note 5, at 2156-57.
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ployers is questionable. In 1976, the Supreme Court, in Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer, 0 affirmed Congress' power to control discrimination by
public bodies but did not address whether Congress could impose
the Griggs impact standard on those entities. The holding that Con-
gress could enact the 1972 amendments and thereby subject govern-
ment employers to the proscriptions of the antidiscriminatory stric-
tures of Title VII81 unequivocally confirmed that Congress could so
act under its powers to enforce the fourteenth amendment, s2 inter-
preted in the broadest possible terms.8
3
80. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). The plaintiffs in Fitzpatrick, male employees of the State of
Connecticut, protested that state scheme for retirement benefits discriminated against them
in violation of Title VII because of their sex. Id. at 448. The Supreme Court agreed, thus
upholding congressional authority to regulate the employment practices of state govern-
ments. Id. at 456.
81. The defendant in Fitzpatrick argued specifically that the eleventh amendment prohib-
its Congress from authorizing suits against states and state officials, as are permitted by the
1972 amendments to Title VII. The Court held, "[Tihe Eleventh Amendment, and the
principle of sovereignty which it embodies . . . are necessarily limited by the enforcement
provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 456.
For decisions upholding the extension of Congress' Title VII power to the states under § 5
of the fourteenth amendment, see United States v. New Hampshire, 539 F.2d 277 (1st Cir.
1976), cert. denied. 429 U.S. 1023 (1977); Curran v. Portland School Comm., 435 F. Supp.
1063 (D. Me. 1977); United States v. City of Milwaukee, 395 F. Supp. 725 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
82. 427 U.S. 445, 447 (1976). The Senate and House reports clearly reflect Congress' use of
its fourteenth amendment power to extend Title VII. S. REP. No. 415, supra note 5, at 11;
H.R. REP. No. 238. supra note 5, at 19, reprinted in AD. NEWS, supra note 5, at 2154.
83. Although the Court did not discuss whether federalism might limit congressional power
to affect the operation of state governments, the Court implied that Congress has almost
unlimited powers to act under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment. "When Congress acts
pursuant to § 5. . . . the Court said, "not only is it exercising legislative authority that is
plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority under one
section of a Constitutional Amendment whose other sections by their own terms embody
limitations on State authority." 427 U.S. at 456. The Court historically has interpreted the
enforcement powers of Congress broadly. In Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880), the manner
of enforcing the fourteenth amendment was held to be within the discretion of Congress. Id.
at 318. The Court elaboratetl on the mode of enforcement in Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339
(1880):
All of the Amendments derive much of their force from this latter provision [§
5 of the fourteenth amendment]. It is not said the judicial power of the general
government shall extend to enforcing the prohibitions and to protecting the
rights and immunities guaranteed. It is not said that branch of the government
shall be authorized to declare void any action of a State in violation of the
prohibitions. It is the power of Congress which has been enlarged. Congress is
authorized to enforce the prohibitions by appropriate legislation. Some legisla-
tion is contemplated to make the amendments fully effective. Whatever legisla-
tion is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the amendments
have in view. whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they
372
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The assumption fostered by Fitzpatrick that public employers
could be held to the same standard as private employers is under-
mined, however, by the Court's decision in Washington v. Davis,84
decided shortly before Fitzpatrick. The plaintiffs in Davis were two
black applicants rejected by the District of Columbia Metropolitan
Police Department. 5 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's use
of a general literacy test for employment screening violated the due
process clause of the fifth amendment," section 1981 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866,87 and the District of Columbia Code. 8 The plain-
tiffs did not sue under Title VII; 9 rather, they based their motion
for summary judgment solely on constitutional grounds. 0 The Su-
preme Court, however, after ruling on the constitutional claims, also
ruled on the statutory grounds."
Holding that disdriminatory effect was insufficient to sustain a
constitutional challenge of an employment practice92 and that proof
of intent was necessary to establish a violation of the plaintiffs'
constitutional rights,93 the Court reversed the court'of appeals on the
contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil
rights and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if
not prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional power.
Id. at 345-46.
84. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
85. Id. at 232-33.
86. See note 15 supra.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall
be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions
of every kind, and to no other.
88. Section 1-320 of the District of Columbia Code provides:
In any program of recruitment or hiring of individuals to fill positions in the
government of the District of Columbia, no officer or employee of the govern-
ment of the District of Columbia shall exclude or give preference to the residents
of the District of Columbia or any State of the United States on the basis of
residence, religion, race, color, or national origin.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-320 (1973).
89. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238 n.10 (1976).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 248. It should be noted that the Court ruled on the statutory claims despite the
fact that plaintiffs had not raised those grounds on appeal.
92. Id. at 239.
93. Id. After tracing cases involving discrimination in schools, jury lists, and other situa-
tions, the Court concluded, "Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole
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constitutional issues. In dicta, however, the Court reaffirmed the
applicability of the impact standard to Title VII litigation. More-
over, in reaching the statutory claims, the Court applied standards
similar to those of Title VII, implying that Title VII's mandate was
almost identical to those of the two statutes invoked by the plain-
tiffs.9 5 The district court had found discriminatory effect using Title
VII standards," but held that the tests were job-related.97 The court
of appeals reversed, finding no direct relationship between the intel-
ligence test and job performance,98 although a validation study did
show a correlation with success in the police training course. The
Supreme Court reversed on the issue of job-relatedness, finding the
correlation between the test and success in the training course suffi-
cient to justify the test even though it was not shown to predict
actual job performance.
Thus, in determining whether the test scores were related to suc-
cess in the job training program, the Court apparently chose not to
apply the strict scrutiny used in Griggs and Albemarle.' Although
the Court in Davis asserted that their current decision was not
foreclosed by those earlier cases,"' the dissenting opinion strongly
disputed 1°2 this statement. Dicta in Davis indicated that the holding
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution." Id. at 243.
One reason for the Court's holding in Davis was a fear that many state and federal statutes
having unequal effects on the affluent and the poor would be vulnerable to challenge. Id. at
248. Application of the impact standard to the limited area of employment, however, would
not lead to widespread invalidation of state and federal laws; nor would it unduly burden
state and local governments because they are given the opportunity to prove the job-
relatedness and business necessity of their practices, thereby successfully defending against
such challenges. Comment, The Constitutionality of the Extension of Title VII "Disparate
Impact Discrimination" to State and Local Governments, 32 ARK. L. REV. 68, 82 (1978).
94. Id. at 247-48.
95. Id. at 250. A concurring opinion commented that since Title VII was not at issue, Title
VII standards were not applicable to the statutory claims. Id. at 255-56 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring). The dissent criticized the Court for reaching the statutory issues at all. Id. at 257-58
(Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent also complained that the Court did not state explicitly
which standards were being applied to the statutory claims. Id. at 258. Because the language
of the District of Columbia Code, see note 87 supra, is so similar to that of Title VII, the
argumeni that the Court was implying that a similar result would occur under Title VII is
even more persuasive.
96. Davis v. Washington, 348 F. Supp. 15, 16 (D.D.C. 1972).
97. Id. at 17.
98. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 964-65 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
99. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 251-53 (1976).
100. Id. at 251-52.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 260 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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in Griggs, mandating the impact standard and strict scrutiny of job-
relatedness, still governs Title VII cases; the Court's decision that
the intelligence -test was job-related, however, renders this aside
questionable. In particular, Davis suggests that the employment
practices of public employers will not be as strictly examined for
job-relatedness as those of private employers." 3
Further confusing the question, dicta in General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert, ' 4 a Title VII case also decided in 1976, suggests that the
constitutional intent standard applies to state and local govern-
ments. The Supreme Court in Gilbert rejected the contention of
female employees that the defendant corporation practiced sex dis-
crimination by excluding pregnancy benefits from its employee dis-
ability plan.1 5 Failure to include these benefits was not gender-
based, said the Court, because it merely removed one physical con-
dition from coverage for. all employees.0 ' Although the Court failed
to find discriminatory effect, it reaffirmed the Griggs reasoning that
a showing of discriminatory impact without proof of purposeful dis-
crimination often is sufficient to establish a violation under Title
VII in a suit against a private employer." 7 Nevertheless, the Court
suggested that because the language used by Congress in the Title
VII amendments was similar to language in earlier Court decisions
on discrimination under the fourteenth amendment, the same stan-
dards might apply to both situations.0 ' This suggestion is surpris-
103. Alternatively, one might argue that the Court has decided that a correlation with a
training program is acceptable to prove job-relatedness by both public and private employers.
This decision may indicate the Court's desire to lighten the employer's heavy burden of proof,
apparently mandated by Griggs. Moreover, because validation against a training program
was not at issue in Griggs, Griggs did not foreclose the use of a correlation with a training
program. See Balog, Employment Testing and Proof of Job Relatedness: A Tale of Unreason-
able Constraints, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 95, 104 (1976); Lerner, Washington v. Davis: Quality
and Equality in Employment Testing, 1976 Sup. CT. REv. 263, 268; Comment, Employment
Discrimination-Washington v. Davis: Splitting the Causes of Action Against Racial Dis-
crimination in Employment, 8 Loy. CHi. L.J. 225, 227 (1976).
104. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
105. Id. at 136.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 136-37.
108. Id. at 133. The Court explained:
While there is no necessary inference that Congress, in choosing this language,
intended to incorporate into Title VII the concepts of discrimination which have
evolved from court decisions construing the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the similarities between the congressional language
and some of those decisions surely indicate that the latter are a useful starting
1978]
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ing, for the same language in the original Title VII was interpreted
as establishing a far stricter test than the constitutional test of
purposeful discrimination, a distinction clearly acknowledged in
Davis. "I
UNITED STATES V. CITY OF CHICAGO
Lacking clear Supreme Court guidance, lower courts must deter-
mine two major issues in suits brought under the 1972 amendments:
whether to judge government employers by the Title VII impact
standards of Griggs or by the constitutional intent standard of
Davis; and how strictly to apply the requirement of job-relatedness
to the challenged tests or criteria. To answer these questions, lower
courts first must decide if Congress can expand the substantive
guarantees of the fourteenth amendment through legislation passed
under its section 5 power, and to what degree, if any, federalism
insulates state and local governments from congressional regulation
of their employment practices.
In United States v. City of Chicago,"'9 the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit addressed these issues and held that discrimi-
point in interpreting the former. Particularly in the case of defining the term
'discrimination,' which Congress has nowhere in Title VII defined, those cases
afford an existing body of law analyzing and discussing that term in a legal
context not wholly dissimilar to the concerns which Congress manifested in
enacting Title VII.
Id. The Court continued:
The concept of "discrimination," of course, was well known at the time of the
enactment of Title VII, having been associated with the Fourteenth Amendment
for nearly a century, and carrying with it a long history of judicial construction.
When Congress makes it unlawful for an employer to "discriminate. . .because
of . . . sex . . ..." without further explanation of its'meaning, we should not
readily infer that it meant something different from what the concept of discrim-
ination has traditionally meant.
Id. at 145 (citations omitted).
109. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976). The Court, distinguishing between
constitutional and statutory standards, wrote:
As the Court of Appeals understood Title VII, employees or applicants proceed-
ing under it need not concern themselves with the employer's possibly discrimi-
natory purpose but instead may focus solely on the racially differential impact
of the challenged hiring or promotion practices. This is not the constitutional
rule. We have never held that the constitutional standard for adjudicating
claims of invidious racial discrimination is identical to the standards applicable
under Title VII, and we decline to do so today.
Id. (footnote omitted).
110. 573 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1978).
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natory effect is enough, even without proof of intent to discriminate,
to constitute a prima facie violation of Title VII by a local govern-
ment and that the government can defend only by demonstrating a
direct relationship to the job itself.1"
The Chicago case began on March 15, 1973, when the United
States sued to enjoin a pattern or practice of discriminatory employ-
ment by the Chicago Fire Department and the Chicago Civil Service
Commission. The complaint alleged that the defendants had dis-
criminated against black and Hispanic incumbents and applicants
for employment in their recruitment, hiring, promotion, transfer,
and assignment practices. "' After trial on the merits, the district
court found that although the promotional examinations used by
the defendants had an adverse impact on blacks, they were job-
related and therefore did not violate Title VII.11 In addition, the
court held that neither the efficiency ratings used by defendants in
formulating promotion lists nor their transfer and assignment poli-
cies offended Title VII." Therefore, the lower court refused to grant
the relief sought by the United States, including a permanent in-
junction prohibiting further promotions based on current eligibility
lists."15
On appeal, the United States challenged the district court's find-
ing that the tests and rating were job-related as required by
Griggs."' Griggs and Davis also were cited for the assertion that. the
111. Id. at 419.
112. Id. at 420-24, 428.
113. Id. at 420.
114. Id.
116. Id. The eligibility lists used by the Chicago Fire Department ranked candidates ac-
cording to composite scores consisting of performances on a written promotional examination
administered by the Chicago Civil Service Commission (weighted 60%), efficiency ratings
given by supervisory personnel (weighted 30%), and seniority (weighted 10%). Id. at 419. The
Commission placed only those candidates with a composite score of 70 or higher on the
eligibility lists. Id. As vacancies occurred, individuals received promotions in accordance with
their respective composite scores. Id.
Although the district court refused to enjoin the use of the scores, it ordered the defendants
to comply with the EEOC guidelines on efficiency ratings, to provide the United States with
a competent validation study of any contemplated promotional examination at least thirty
days prior to its use, and to post all vacancies in each firehouse at least thirty days before
they were filled and post transfer orders in each fire station giving relevant background
information on each transferee. Id. at 420.
While the United States' appeal was pending, the court of appeals granted its motion for
an injunction against promotions planned by the defendants. Id.
116. Brief for Appellant at 48, United States v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d 416 (7th Cir.
1978).
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district court erred in its belief that the appellant's failure to estab-
lish intentional discrimination was legally significant. The Seventh
Circuit reversed and remanded for further findings,"' holding that
no showing of intentional discrimination was necessary in Title VII
cases against local governments in which a disproportionate impact
was shown." 9 The court's summary of the approach for successfully
suing a governmental employer followed the procedure announced
in Albemarle for suing a private employer. 20 On remand, the court
further directed that a strict scrutiny of job-relatedness, similar to
that conducted in Griggs and Albemarle, be undertaken by the
district court.' This strict scrutiny requirement, stressing the
EEOC guidelines, contrasts dramatically with the rather superficial
examination of job-relatedness undertaken in Davis. 12
The Intent Requirement
The City of Chicago contended that the entire promotional pro-
cess, not just its component testing procedures, must be shown to
have a statistically adverse impact on a protected class, and thus
appellant failed to show a sufficiently disproportionate impact to
establish a prima facie case of Title VII violations. 2 3 Furthermore,
in an argument not pursued below, the appellees used the district
court's finding of good faith and conscientiousness in eliminating
race as a factor in promoting and transfering employees to maintain
that absent a showing of intentional discrimination, an employer
has not engaged in an unlawful employment practice.'24
117. Id.
118. United States v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d 416, 427 (7th Cir. 1978). In addition, the
parties and the district court were ordered to consider whether the decision in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), applied to presently posted
eligibility lists based on promotional examinations given before the effective date of the 1972
amendments. 573 F.2d at 424.
In Teamsters, the Court held that, absent an intent to discriminate, a seniority system
perpetuating pre-Title VII discrimination was not an unlawful employment practice. 431 U.S.
at 353-54. The Court interpreted Title VII and its legislative history as immunizing a bona
fide seniority system even if the employer's pre-Act discrimination resulted in whites having
greater existing seniority rights than blacks. Id.
119. United States v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d 416, 424 (7th Cir. 1978).
120. See notes 58-60 supra & accompanying text.
121. 573 F.2d at 427.
122. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 249-53 (1976).
123. Brief for Appellee at 11-12, 14, United States v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d 416 (7th
Cir. 1978).
124. Id. at 5-7.
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Chicago's claim that a showing of intentional discrimination is
necessary under the Title VII amendments was supported by three
arguments. The appellees asserted that the Supreme Court in
Gilbert indicated that concepts of discrimination under Title VII
and the fourteenth amendment may be equivalent.' 21 Therefore, the
fourteenth amendment rule, as defined in Davis, would require trac-
ing the invidious quality of official action to a racially discrimina-
tory purpose. 26 The appellees' second argument was that a statute
can be no broader than its constitutional basis, which, in the case
of the Title VII amendments, is the fourteenth amendment with its
intentional discrimination test.127 Finally, the appellees contended,
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the concept of federalism, as
embodied in the tenth amendment,rs limited Congress' power to
regulate state and local governments under the commerce clause
and eliminated that clause as a possible alternative source of con-
gressional authority for extending Title VII to local governmental
bodies. 121
Standards Under Title VII and The Fourteenth Amendment Not
Identical
The Seventh Circuit rejected the appellees' contention that re-
cent Supreme Court decisions had modified the standard for estab-
lishing a prima facie case of discrimination under Title V1I.'3 The
court emphasized the language in Davis expressly refuting the ap-
plication of the constitutional requirement of discriminatory pur-
pose to Title VII litigation. 3 ' In reply to the appellees' reliance on
the dicta in Gilbert 1 2 the court countered any inference that the
standards of proof are identical under Title VII and the fourteenth
125. Id. at 8.
126. Id. at 8-9; see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239-40.
127. Brief for Appellee at 9, United States v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1978).
128. The tenth amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. AMEND. X.
129. Brief for Appellee at 9, United States v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1978)
(citing National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)).
130. United States v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d 416, 422 (7th Cir. 1978). The Seventh
Circuit recently applied the effects test to an analogous employment discrimination claim
asserted by the United States against the Chicago Police Department. United States v. City
of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977).
131. United States v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d at 421.
132. See notes 17-18, 104-08 supra & accompanying text.
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amendment by citing the Supreme Court's reaffirmation in Gilbert
of the impact standard of Griggs for Title VII cases.' 3 In Gilbert,
the court of appeals reiterated, because a showing of discriminatory
impact had not been made, the question of whether intent or mere
impact was required to prove discrimination was not reached.' 34 To
buttress its adherence to the Griggs test of disparate impact plus
absence of job-relatedness, the court cited Supreme Court cases
subsequent to both Davis and Gilbert that reaffirmed Griggs. 135
In reply to the appellees' second argument, that a statute can be
no broader than its constitutional basis, the Seventh Circuit agreed
that the 1972 amendments were enacted pursuant to Congress'
power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.'3  The court
contended, however, that the legislative history of that Act docu-
mented congressional intent to confer on government employees
protection equivalent to that accorded private employees as defined
133. 573 F.2d at 421.
134. Id.
135. Among the Title VII cases cited by the court was Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S.
136 (1977). In Nashville, an employer denied accumulated seniority to employees returning
from pregnancy leave. The policy forced women to suffer a hardship that male employeesdid
not, thereby depriving them of employment opportunities in a job-bidding system based on
seniority. The Court held that the policy violated Title VII. The Court emphasized that it
was not deciding whether intent was necessary to establish a violation of § 703(a)(1) of Title
VII if a facially neutral plan was at issue. Id. at 144. On the facts of the case, however, the
Court held that proof of discriminatory effect was sufficient to establish a Title VII violation.
Id.
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), was also cited by the Court. In Dothard, female
plaintiffs charged that Alabama's statutory minimum height and weight requirements for
employment in the State's correctional system and gender criteria for the assignment of
correctional counselors discriminated against them on the basis of sex in violation of Title
VII and other federal statutes. Plaintiffs demonstrated statistically the grossly discriminatory
impact of the job requirements on women. A three-judge federal district court found in the
plaintiffs' favor. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's holding that Title VII, as
amended in 1972, prohibited the State of Alabama from applying its statutory height and
weight requirements to the claimants. The Court, however, did find sex a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification in assigning employees to certain positions in a maximum security male
prison. Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented, arguing that in the absence of evidence
proving the disruptive effect on discipline of female security guards, the State could not
deprive women of job opportunities just because they were women. Such deprivation, they
continued, only served to perpetuate stereotypical assumptions about men and women. Id.
at 2734.
The Court in Dothard said of Griggs and Albemarle, "Those cases make clear that to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff need only show that the facially
neutral standards in question select applicants for hire in a significantly discriminatory
pattern." Id. at 2726.
136. 573 F.2d at 422; accord, Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 447 (1976).
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in Griggs. 3 As the court defined it, the relevant issue was "whether
the 1972 amendments with their authorization of the Griggs ration-
ale is appropriate legislation within the meaning of § 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment to enforce that Amendment's prohibition
against discrimination." 3 ' The court concluded that Congress had
ample authority under section 5 to demand that employers meet a
more stringent standard under Title VII than is required by the
fourteenth amendment. 13 9
The Seventh Circuit's conclusion that Congress can establish by
statute a higher standard than is demanded by that statute's consti-
tutional authority relied heavily on an analogy to the Supreme
Court's treatment of literacy tests prior and subsequent to the en-
actment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.140 In Katzenbach v.
Morgan,'' the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Voting Rights Act,"' enacted under the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments, although the Act required that literacy tests meet a
stricter standard of nondiscrimination than was demanded by the
fourteenth amendment.'43 By allowing Congress to abolish discrimi-
natory literacy tests similar to ones that had been found constitu-
tional, the Court in effect upheld Congress' power under section 5
of the fourteenth amendment to legislate a standard more stringent
than was required by the constitutional basis of the legislation it-
self.44 The court reasoned that if Congress had the power under the
137. 573 F.2d at 422. See also S. REP. No. 415, supra note 5, at 5 n.1; H.R. REP. No. 238,
supra note 5, at 8, reprinted in AD. NEws, supra note 5, at 2144 (citing Griggs as illustrative
of one form of discrimination, that is, tests having a discriminatory effect and not justified
by overriding business necessity).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 423-24.
140. Id. at 422-23.
141. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
142. When Katzenbach was decided, the Voting Rights Act provided in pertinent part:
Congress hereby declares that to secure the rights under the fourteenth amend-
ment of persons educated in American-flag schools in which the predominant
classroom language was other than English, it is necessary to prohibit the States
from conditioning the right to vote of such persons on ability to read, write,
understand, or interpret any matter in the English language.
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (Supp. I 1964). See also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966) (upholding the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
143. In 1959, the Supreme Court held that a North Carolina English literacy test was not
violative of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendments. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of
Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
144. United States v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d at 423.
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fourteenth amendment to declare illegal a state law of a type pre-
viously viewed as constitutional, then surely it could enforce the
fourteenth amendment by approving, as applicable to state and
local governments, a judicial construction of discrimination derived
from a statutory proscription. 1 5
The Court in Katzenbach, echoing McCulloch v. Maryland,4'
stated that the standard for determining whether legislation is ap-
propriate under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment is whether
the end is legitimate and the means appropriate. 4 7 "Correctly
viewed, § 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Con-
gress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what
legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment."'' The issue then is not whether the Davis decision
precluded congressional attempts to require impact rather than in-
tent as the standard of proof, but whether the legislation passed was
appropriate within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.'
Applying this test, the Seventh Circuit determined that the 1972
amendments were passed under section 5 to enforce the antidiscri-
mination proscriptions of the fourteenth amendment's equal protec-
tion clause 50 and that they were appropriate means to fulfill the
purpose of that clause.' Congress possessed the authority to bal-
ance the opposing policy considerations and to grant public employ-
ers protection equal to that received by private employees under the
Griggs standard.'5 The court of appeals thus adopted an expansive
145. Id.
146. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). The Court wrote, "Let the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional." Id. at 421 (footnote omitted).
147. 384 U.S. at 649-50.
148. Id. at 651.
149. Id.
150. The legislative history of the 1972 Amendments clearly supports the court's view:
The Constitution is imperative in its prohibition of discrimination by State and
local governments. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal treatment of
all citizens by States and their political subdivisions, and the Supreme Court
has reinforced this directive by holding that State action which denies equal
protection of the laws to any person, even if only indirectly, is in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. It is clear that the guarantee of equal protection
must also extend to such direct action as discriminatory employment practices.
S. REP. No. 415, supra note 5, at 10 (footnote omitted). See also H.R. RP. No. 238, supra
note 5, at 8; reprinted in AD. NEws, supra note 5, at 2153.
151. United States v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d at 423.
152. Id.
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reading of Congress' power under the fourteenth amendment. The
test announced in Katzenbach and followed by the Seventh Circuit
in Chicago is similar to that applied to legislation under the com-
merce clause, which has been interpreted as giving Congress almost
unlimited power to legislate against discrimination. 53 Accordingly,
Congress could supplant the fourteenth amendment standard of
intent with the more rigorous impact standard of Griggs in the Title
VII amendments provided that the court could perceive a rational
basis for Congress' legislative judgment.
Not all courts and scholars agree that Congress can establish a
more stringent standard by statute than is imposed by the statute's
constitutional foundation. The dissent in Katzenbach argued that
such a rationale gave Congress, not the Court, the power to decide
whether the fourteenth amendment had been violated."4 Congress,
the dissent insisted, could only remedy judicially determined viola-
tions of the fourteenth amendment, not declare the substance of
those violations. 5' Under the dissent's reasoning, the Court would
not sustain a congressional determination merely because the exten-
sion of Title VII was appropriate legislation plainly adapted to the
elimination of pervasive discrimination.15 Therefore, the congres-
sional determination that discriminatory impact violates Title VII
should not be upheld since this standard does not comport with the
Court's conclusion that proof of intentional discrimination is re-
153. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); see, e.g., Katzenbach
v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). In McClung, the Court upheld sections of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, outlawing racial discrimination against customers by any restaurant, as a lawful
extension of congressional authority under the commerce clause, if the restaurant's customers
include interstate travelers or if a substantial portion of the food served has moved in inter-
state commerce. Id. at 304. Commenting on the breadth of Congress' power to legislate under
the commerce clause, the Court wrote: "The power of Congress in this field is broad and
sweeping; where it keeps within its sphere and violates no express constitutional limitation
it has been the rule of this Court, going back almost to the founding days of the Republic,
not to interfere." Id. at 305. ,
Justice Douglas, believing that Congress' power to enact legislation prohibiting discrimina-
tion under the fourteenth amendment was as broad or broader than its power under the tenth
amendment would have preferred that the legislation had been upheld under the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 279 (Douglas, J., concurring). As Justice Douglas explained, "It is rather
my belief that the right of people to be free of state action that discriminates against them
because of race . . . 'occupies a more protected position in our constitutional system than
does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal across state lines."' Id. (quoting Edwards
v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941)).
154. 384 U.S. at 667-68 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 666.
156. Id. at 668.
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quired to constitute a violation of the fourteenth amendment's anti-
discriminatory strictures.
Analogous to the dissent's reasoning in Katzenbach is the holding
of Scott v. City of Anniston,'57 decided in 1977. The district court
in Scott interpreted Davis as requiring that the intent standard be
applied to state and local governments sued under Title VII.'18 Re-
peating the appellees' argument in Chicago and the dissent in
Katzenbach, the court in Scott held that the constitutional intent
standard was applicable because a statute can be only as broad as
its constitutional source.'59 Thus, in amending Title VII by use of
its authority under the fourteenth amendment, Congress could not
require employers to meet a more stringent standard than the Su-
preme Court established in Davis for employment discrimination
under the fourteenth amendment.' 0
The Supreme Court's decision in Oregon v. Mitchell ' also may
bolster the argument that Congress is not empowered to define dis-
crimination as broadly as it may believe necessary. In Mitchell, the
Court ruled that Congress lacked authority under the fourteenth or
fifteenth amendments to lower the voting age in state elections to
eighteen under the Voting Rights Amendments of 1970.12 The
Court, however, did uphold the power of Congress to abolish literacy
tests for voting because the tests historically have been used to
discriminate against racial minorities.' 3 One possible explanation
for this discrepancy in the Court's treatment of literacy tests and
the age requirement is that states could articulate more easily a
plausible defense for laws setting a minimum voting age over eigh-
teen than it could rationalize laws limiting the electorate to those
who can read and write, especially when such rationalizations have
been used in the past to justify preventing racial minorities from
voting. Another reason for the discrepancy could be that eradicating
racial discrimination has a higher priority than eliminating age dis-
157. 430 F. Supp. 508 (N.D. Ala. 1977). In Scott, black employees in the public works
department of the City of Anniston brought a class action suit against the city and others
alleging that the defendants engaged in racially discriminatory employment practices. Id. at
510-11.
158. Id. at 515.
159. Id.
160. Id. Scott is now on appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
161. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
162. Id. at 118.
163. Id. at 132-33.
[Vol. 20:357
TITLE VII IMPACT STANDARD
crimination. If this is true, then Mitchell actually may support the
argument that Congress may define discrimination broadly; Title
VII, like the statute banning literacy tests, seeks to abolish laws and
practices without rational support that historically have discrimi-
nated against certain minorities.
Furthermore, the majority opinion in Katzenbach supports the
view that Congress can expand the antidiscriminatory guarantees
secured by the fourteenth amendment.64 One commentator, after
studying the fourteenth amendment's legislative history, believes
that the drafters of the amendment clearly intended to give Con-
gress the power under section 5 to exceed the substantive rights
guaranteed by that amendment and that even the concept of feder-
alism does not limit Congress' power to act against the states in
expanding the guarantees of that amendment."5 Another observer
has written that "it is clear that congressional enactments pursuant
to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment may properly proscribe
discriminatory conduct which is not reached by the broad terms of
the fourteenth amendment prohibition." '6 Therefore, if Congress'
power to enact antidiscriminatory legislation under section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment is interpreted broadly by the Court, Con-
gress may have the power to promulgate a more stringent standard
for the limited area of employment discrimination than is imposed
by the substantive provisions of the fourteenth amendment.
RESTRAINTS IMPOSED BY FEDERAISM
The problem remains, however, of determining what limits, if
any, federalism imposes on congressional action against the states.
The appellees in Chicago cited National League of Cities v. Usery67
to support their argument that federalism prohibits Congress from
regulating state and local government employers to the same degree
it regulates private employers. The Court in Usery held that federal-
ism limited Congress' authority to regulate the wages and hours of
state government employees under the commerce clause."" One rea-
164. 384 U.S. at 651 n.10.
165. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action against State
Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 1413, 1463 (1975).
166. Note, Applying the Title VII Prima Facie Case to Title VII Litigation, 11 H~Av. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 128, 141 (1976) (footnote omitted).
167. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
168. In Usery, the Court held that Congress exceeded its authority under the commerce
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son given for the Court's holding was that state and local govern-
mental officials should be allowed to exercise administrative control
over their own governments so that necessary services could be pro-
vided to residents in the most efficient and orderly manner.'69 Argu-
ably, this rationale would not apply to the facts of Chicago because
the discrimination Title VII seeks to eliminate is neither a necessary
element of orderly administration nor a worthwhile goal of state and
local governments; thus, it may not merit the same protection from
congressional regulation as the freedom of local governments to de-
termine the wages and hours of their employees.
71
As the Seventh Circuit recognized in Chicago, the analogy to
Usery is imperfect because Usery involved the commerce clause,
whereas the Title VII amendments were issued under the fourteenth
amendment. 7' Congressional power to legislate under section 5 of
the fourteenth amendment to eliminate discrimination by state gov-
ernments always has been interpreted broadly, often in clear derog-
ation of state sovereignty. 72 Calling such power plenary, the Court
clause by extending the Fair Labor Standards Act to state and local governments in an
attempt to regulate the wages and hours of state and local governmental employees. Id. at
838.
Because of the four-one-four split in Usery and the vehemence of the dissenting opinions,
whether Usery will be extended in the future is doubtful. Justice Blackmun's concurrence
indicates that, although he believed that the Court's opinion was correct with respect to the
statute in question, he was troubled by certain aspects of the majority opinion. Id. at 856
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Although admitting that he might be interpreting the majority
opinion incorrectly, Justice Blackmun suggested that the Court had adopted a balancing
approach and would not prohibit federal regulation in areas "where the federal interest is
demonstrably greater and where state facility compliance with imposed federal standards
would be essential." Id.
169. Id. at 840-52.
170. Id. at 846-48. That the Court in Usery distinguished "between federal legislation
enacted to regulate commerce and similar legislation enacted to enforce rights under § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment" has been suggested. L. TRIE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
313 (1978).
171. The Court in Usery stated specifically that it expressed no view on whether the same
outcome would result if federal legislation regulating state governmental actions is enacted
under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment. 426 U.S. at 852 n.17.
172. The suggestion has been made that "[t]he drafters of the fourteenth amendment
would . . . not have tolerated a position which denied Congress the power to create private
causes of action enforceable in federal courts against states which refused to extend protection
to the rights embodied in section one of the amendment." Nowak, supra note 165, at 1463.
Opponents of the amendment concentrated their attack on the extensive power granted to
Congress by the amendment to supplant state laws. Id. at 1461. The amendment's propo-
nents, however, did not attempt to refute this argument. They simply responded that Con-
gress must possess such broad powers to guarantee that the natural rights of citizens would
be protected. Id. As Mr. Novak commented:
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in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer73 perhaps implied that the tenth amend-
ment does not limit Congress' power to act under section 5 if its
purpose is to end discrimination by appropriate and reasonable leg-
islation.' 74 The Court referred to the Civil War amendments as "an
important part of the basic alteration in our federal system ....
As a result of the new structure of law that emerged in the post Civil
War era-and especially of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was
its centerpiece-the role of the Federal Government as a guarantor
of basic federal rights against state power was clearly estab-
lished." 75
Refusing to decide the issue of the possible restraints imposed
upon Congress by the doctrine of federalism, the court of appeals
in Chicago stated that the appellees' argument was not pertinent
since Congress had relied upon section 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment rather than on the commerce clause in enacting the 1972
amendments to Title VII. 1 71 In addition, the court commented that
its holding that the Griggs standards could be incorporated into the
1972 amendments under section 5 rendered the determination
whether the same outcome could have been accomplished under the
commerce clause unnecessary.' 77
ETihe statements of both the proponents and the opponents of the amendment
were based on the assumption that the Congress would have virtually uncon-
trolled power to enforce the substance of the amendment. Whatever else may
be said of the fourteenth amendment debates, it cannot be claimed that the
power of Congress to enforce the substantive provisions of the amendment was
not understood at the time. Indeed, most of the debate concerning the substan-
tive provisions related to the great power that they would give Congress to
supersede state laws and the resulting modifications of the principles of federal-
ism as they had been understood in pre-war times.
Id. at 1460-61.
173. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
174. Id. at 456. One commentator emphasizes that the Court in Fitzpatrick did not men-
tion any constraints imposed by federalism on Congress' authority to regulate racial or sexual
discrimination under the fourteenth amendraent. L. TRIBE, AMEFiCAN CONSTTUTIONAL LAW
313 (1978). Tribe interprets Fitzpatrick as indicating that despite the restraints placed on
congressional action in Usery, such action undertaken to enforce fourteenth amendment
rights may not be challenged successfully, although the action violates traditional concepts
of state sovereignty. Id. at 272-73 n.61.
175. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S 225, 238-39 (1972) (footnote omitted and emphasis sup-
plied).
176. 573 F.2d at 424.
177. Id. In Scott v. City of Anniston, 430 F. Supp. 508 (N.D. Ala. 1977), the court, echoing
the appellees' arguments in Chicago and quoting from Usery, held that in a Title VII action
federalism prohibits Congress from regulating state and local governments to the same degree
it regulates the private sector. Id. at 514-17.
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JOB-RELATEDNESS
In Chicago, the Seventh Circuit arguably was correct in conclud-
ing that a statute can embody a more stringent standard than its
constitutional source. In addition. a valid argument can be made
that federalism does not limit Congress' power to legislate against
discrimination if Congress acts under the fourteenth amendment.
The court correctly surmised that by enacting the Title VII amend-
ments Congress meant to extend the strict Griggs standard of im-
pact to state and local governments. 1 8 The court, however, in im-
posing the stringent Griggs job-relatedness test on a public em-
ployer, may have misread the tenor of recent Supreme Court deci-
sions. In Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court accepted as proof
of job-relatedness a correlation between the employment test and
performance in a training program rather than demanding a correla-
tion with actual job performance. This failure to require a correla-
tion with job performance may indicate the Court's reluctance to
demand that a public employer meet the strict standards of job-
relatedness imposed by Griggs. Nevertheless, the court in Chicago
followed Griggs and Albemarle in its deference to the EEOC
Guidelines and in its demand that employment tests administered
by public employers be directly related to the actual tasks to be
performed on the job.17
Change in the Job-Relatedness Test
Given the sharp divisions of the Court in Davis and that Title VII
was not directly at issue, confusion over Davis' impact on Title VII
litigation against state and local governments is understandable. At
least one district court, in United States v. South Carolina, 180 argua-
bly interpreted Davis as imposing a more lenient job-relatedness
standard on public employers than was held applicable to private
employers by the Supreme Court in Griggs and Albemarle.
In South Carolina, the plaintiffs sued the state of South Carolina,
alleging that its use of the National Teacher's Examination (NTE)
178. See note 8 supra & accompanying text.
179. At least two Justices have expressed doubt as to whether strict compliance with the
EEOC Guidelines is required. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 449 (1975)
(Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 451 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
180. 445 F. Supp. 1094 (D.S.C. 1977), aff'd, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978).
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to determine the hiring and pay classification of teachers violated
the fourteenth amendment and Title VII.' 81 The plaintiffs statisti-
cally proved the test's discriminatory impact, but failed to prove
discriminatory intent. 8 To justify the use of the NTE, the state
demonstrated a correlation between results on the NTE and per-
formance in teacher-training programs at the state's colleges and
universities. 3 Seeking guidance from Davis on both the constitu-
tional and Title VII claims, the court held the impact standard
applicable to state and local governments sued under Title VI.\Tfl
Moreover, finding that validation against a training program had
been approved by the Court in Davis, the court also held that the
defendants' evidence of a correlation between scores on the NTE
and success in teacher-training programs was sufficient to prove
job-relatedness." 5 The Supreme Court upheld, without comment,
the district court's decision in South Carolina.8 '
Justice White's dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Brennan,
objected to the Supreme Court's affirmation of the decision because
of the lower court's use of training program correlation as a test for
determining job-relatedness."8 7 The dissenters argued that the vali-
dation study showed no relationship to job performance, as de-
manded by Griggs for cases arising under Title VII.88 At best, the
study measured familiarity with courses given before the pre-
employment test.'89 The test in Davis at least was related to specific
training given after employment to prepare the employee for the
particular job for which he was applying.8 0 The dissenters also ques-
tioned whether the lower court was "legally correct in holding that
the N.T.E. need not be validated against job performance and that
the validation requirement was satisfied by a study which demon-
strated only that a trained person could pass the test."''
The Court's affirmance does not signify that impact is the ac-
181. Id. at 1097.
182. Id. at 1102.
183. Id. at 1113.
184. Id. at 1111.
185. Id. at 1113-14.
186. 434 U.S. 1026 (1978).
187. Id. at 1027 (White, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 1026-27.
189. Id. at 1027.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1028.
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cepted standard for determining the liability of a state government
challenged under Title VII because the lower court also found for the
defendant on the constitutional grounds using the intent standard;
therefore, the result on the Title VII claims would have been the
same had the intent standard been applied. The affirmance, how-
ever, does suggest that, even if use of the impact standard is correct,
correlation with a training program does prove job-relatedness. The
Court, using the strict guidelines of Griggs and Albemarle, other-
wise might have remanded for a determination whether the NTE
was related directly to the teaching jobs themselves.
The burden of proving job-relatedness announced in Griggs and
Albemarle is significantly more difficult to satisfy than the job-
relatedness standard used in Davis. The examination of job-
relatedness in Davis was cursory, did not rely on the EEOC
Guidelines, 12 accepted evidence of a correlation with a training pro-
gram as sufficient to prove job-relatedness, 9 3 and did not demand
that the challenged test measure specific aptitudes or capabilities
for the particular job at issue. One important argument against the
Davis treatment of the issue and its acceptance of a correlation with
a training program is that a training program could be established
that bears little, if any, resemblance to the actual job denied unsuc-
cessful applicants. To meet the Griggs and Albemarle burden of
proving job-relatedness, however, the test must demonstrate a di-
rect relationship to the job itself.'94 Congress intended to prohibit
the use of general ability tests that do not predict the employee's
ability to perform the particular job in question, such as the literacy
test approved in Davis. The Court in Davis, however, was not en-
forcing Title VII; therefore, it was not obliged to follow the congres-
sional intent underlying the enactment of Title VII. For that reason,
the statutory ruling in Davis should not be followed by courts ruling
on Title VII, as was done by the lower court in South Carolina.'6
Nevertheless, because South Carolina was affirmed, although with-
192. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 263 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 250.
194. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 431; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
at 431.
195. 426 U.S. at 269-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority in Davis, defending its
approval of a general intelligence test for hiring policemen, remarked: "It is also apparent to
us, as it was to the District Judge, that some minimum verbal and communicative skill would
be very useful, if not essential, to satisfactory progress in the training regimen." Id. at 250.
196. 445 F. Supp. at 1113.
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out comment, other courts also may follow Davis in deciding the
job-relatedness issue for local or state governments under Title
V11.197
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court recently has reaffirmed impact as the stan-
dard for measuring discrimination in Title VII suits against private
employers."" The Court, however, has not yet considered whether
the extension by Congress to state and local governments of the
substantive provisions of Title VII, including the case law establish-
ing the impact standard, is a proper exercise of its enforcement
powers under the fourteenth amendment. Congress arguably has the
power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to require pub-
lic employers to meet the same antidiscriminatory standards as
private employers, and in extending Title VII, Congress certainly
intended to require governmental employers to meet the Griggs test
of impact and job-relatedness. '99 Thus, the Seventh Circuit's con-
clusion in Chicago is persuasive: Congress, by enacting the 1972
amendments, could and did extend the case law of Griggs and
Albemarle on impact and job-relatedness to state and local govern-
ments.
The decision of the Seventh Circuit in Chicago affirms the power
of Congress to legislate effectively against discrimination, regardless
of the status of the employer, and thus grants to public employees
the alternative statutory remedy Congress intended to create. Nev-
ertheless, the Supreme Court's holding in Usery that the doctrine
197. Until Davis was decided, courts determining how closely job-relatedness should be
scrutinized used Griggs and Albemarle as a gauge. As the dissent in Davis indicates, all other
federal courts deciding Title VII cases under identical proof had reached an opposite result
on the job-relatedness issue. 426 U.S. at 269-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting). To support this
conclusion, the dissent cited United States v. City of Chicago, 385 F. Supp. 543, 555-56 (N.D.
Ill. 1974); Officers for Justice v. C.S.C., 371 F. Supp. 1328, 1337 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Smith v.
City of East Cleveland, 363 F. Supp. 1131, 1148-49 (N.D. Ohio 1973); aff'd in part and rev'd
in part on other grounds, 520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975); Harper v. Mayor of Baltimore, 359 F.
Supp. 1187, 1202-03 (D. Md.), modified and affl'd, 486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973); Pennsylvania
v. O'Neill, 348 F. Supp. 1084, 1090-91 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd in pertinent part and vacated in
part, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973).
198. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15
(1977). In Teamsters, the Court explained that Title VII plaintiffs could claim discrimination
under either disparate treatment or disparate impact theories. Id. On a disparate impact
theory a plaintiff is not required to prove intent. Id.
199. See note 8 supra & accompanying text.
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of federalism may restrain congressional action, its recognition of
intent as the constitutional standard in Davis, and the acceptance
of a training program correlation as proof of job-relatedness may
portend a different result if a similar case receives a full hearing
before the Supreme Court.2 11 Under such circumstances, the Court
could demand a showing of intentional discrimination or it could
find a showing of discriminatory effect sufficient but allow the gov-
ernmental employer to meet a less stringent burden in proving job-
relatedness.
L.C.T.
F.C.B.
200. If the Supreme Court holds that plaintiffs must prove intentional discrimination to
sustain a Title VII challenge against state and local governments, plaintiffs still may be able
to sue using the impact standard if the suit is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See note 87
supra. In Davis, the Supreme Court applied the impact standard to an employer against
whom a § 1981 suit was brought. 426 U.S. at 249. The defendant in Davis, however, was a
branch of the federal government, and the Court may determine that federalism insulates
state and local governments from the application of the impact standard. The Supreme Court
has granted certiorari to hear Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977),
a § 1981 employment suit; therefore, this question may be answered shortly. In Davis v.
County of Los Angeles, the court applied the impact standard to the county government and
indicated its belief that impact also should apply in Title VII suits. Id. at 1340. To justify
the imposition of a stricter standard under § 1981 than under Title VII, it could be argued
that the thirteenth amendment upon which § 1981 is based enjoys greater freedom from the
restraints of federalism than does the fourteenth amendment, the basis of Title VII. As the
court in Davis v. County of Los Angeles remarked, however, Title VII and § 1981 traditionally
have been interpreted to impose the same standards. Id. Accordingly, that the Supreme Court
would distinguish between the two statutes in determining which standard must be met is
somewhat doubtful.
